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Recent Decisions
justify the declaration of the Supreme Court of California that plain-
tiff's status will no longer be determinative.
A. Kathleen Kelly
CONFLICT OF LAWS-DEATH IN STATE TERRITORIAL WATERS-The
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that Penn-
sylvania law governs an action commenced by the administrator of
the estate of a Pennsylvania decedent killed in the crash of an aircraft
into the harbor waters of Boston.
Scott v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 399 F.2d 14 (3d Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 37 U.S.L.W. 3208 (U.S. Dec. 9, 1968).
Plaintiff, administrator of the estate of a Pennsylvania resident killed
in the crash of an Eastern Air Lines jet into Boston Harbor, filed suit
on the "law side"' of the District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania to recover damages for the death of the decedent. Juris-
diction was based on diversity of citizenship and an amount in excess
of the statutory minimum. Plaintiff alleged that the fatality occurred
as the result of Eastern's negligent operation of its jetliner and its
breach of the contract with decedent for nonnegligent carriage.2
After hearing evidence as to liability, the jury returned a verdict for
the plaintiff. The court then permitted testimony on damages, and
over Eastern's objection, instructed the jury to award them in ac-
cordance with the law of Pennsylvania. 3 The jury returned with
verdicts for plaintiff in the sum of $2,500 as compensation under the
1. Since the 1966 coalescence of civil and maritime procedure, this term has become
somewhat imprecise. Today, all actions, whether cognizable as cases at law or in equity or
in admiralty are governed by the same rules. FED. R. Civ. P. 1. However, cases brought
pursuant to the admiralty jurisdiction of the district court are exempt from certain rules
and subject to several others that do not affect other civil actions. For a complete discus-
sion of the unification of the civil and admiralty procedures, see 7A J. MooRE, FEDERAL
PRAcTicE $ .01 et seq. (2d ed. 1966).
2. Plaintiff abandoned a breach of warranty theory before the case came to trial.
3. Eastern had requested the court to charge that damages were to be awarded in
accordance with the law of Massachusetts. The Massachusetts statutes in effect at the
time of the accident limited the liability of one whose negligence has caused the death
of another to "damages in the sum of not less than two thousand dollars nor more than
twenty thousand dollars to be assessed with reference to the degree of culpability" and
also permitted recovery for expenses incurred as a result of the wrong. MAss. GEN.
LAws ANN. ch. 229, § 2 (1958). See also, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 228, § 1(2) (1958).
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Wrongful Death Act 4 and $45,000 payable to defendant's estate pur-
suant to the Pennsylvania Survival Act.5
On appeal this judgment was reversed. However a rehearing was
granted, and the court of appeals, sitting en banc, reversed its prior
decision and affirmed the trial court. 6
The fundamental issue on rehearing was whether the trial court
properly applied the substantive law of Pennsylvania. 7 In order to
justify the application of Pennsylvania law, the court of appeals felt
it necessary'to conclude either (1) that the transaction in question in-
volved a non-maritime contract of carriage, governed by the Penn-
sylvania law articulated in Griflith v. United Air Lines;8 or (2) that
the occurrence constituted a maritime tort which, by virtue of the
conflicts of law approach of the Supreme Court in Lauritzen v. Lar-
sen9 and Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co.,10 would
justify application of Pennsylvania law. In the discussion that fol-
lowed, the court of appeals seemingly reasoned that either alternative
could justify the decision of the trial court.
Dealing first with the claim for breach of the contract of nonnegli-
gent carriage, the court concluded that there was a sufficient basis for
finding a contractual obligation between Eastern and the plaintiff's
decedent, notwithstanding the absence of an official "contract of car-
riage," reasoning that the contractual duty was one imposed by law.11
4. Under the Wrongful Death Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1601 (1953) et seq., recovery
is permitted for funeral expenses and expenses of administration necessitated by the death.
5. Under the Survival Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 320.601 (1950), recovery is allowed
for lost earnings from date of death to trial, less what would have been necessary for
decedent's maintenance, plus future earnings reduced to present worth, less the cost of
decedent's maintenance for his probable life span.
6. On a prior appeal, a panel of three judges had reversed the district court and
remanded the case for a new trial. The court then granted a rehearing and heard the case
en banc. The then Chief Judge Staley wrote the majority opinion in which Judge
Kalodner joined. Judges Seitz and Freedman each wrote concurring opinions. Judge
Hastie wrote a dissent in which Judges Ganey and McLaughlin joined. It is interesting
to note that Judge Seitz was a member of the panel that had initially reversed the lower
court's action.
7. 399 F.2d at 19.
8. 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964). In Griffith, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had
before it a situation very similar to that in Scott; a plane crash had killed a Pennsylvania
resident whose personal representative then sued under the Pennsylvania Survival Act.
After first holding that an action in assumpsit for breach of an implied by law contract
for nonnegligent carriage is valid under Pennsylvania law, the court went on to hold
that it was abandoning the rule that the law of the place of the injury always governs
actions for personal injury in favor of a more flexible rule. The rule adopted allows the
forum to apply the law of the jurisdiction having the most significant contacts with the
issues and the parties.
9. 345 U.S. 571 (1953).
10. 358 U.S. 354 (1959).
11. 399 F.2d at 20.
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In response to Eastern's contention that the cause of action was, in
reality, a maritime tort: transmuted into a suit on a civil contract by
means of an "ancient device of common law pleading"-waiving the
tort and suing in assumpsit-the court cited Weinstein v. Eastern Air-
lines, Inc.12 There, in a case arising out of the identical factual situa-
tion, Chief Judge Biggs stated:
a contract or warranty relating to the airframe or power plant of a
land-based aircraft and a contract of carriage by air between two
cities on the United States mainland are not maritime in sub-
stance, nor are such contracts and warranties made maritime by
virtue of the fact that the aircraft in question flew briefly over
navigable waters en route from Boston to Philadelphia. 3
Thus, since the contract of carriage was not maritime in nature, the
court concluded that it was governed by the law of Pennsylvania, as
espoused by Griffith, and on this basis affirmed the district court's
action.
Not content to base its decision solely on the ground that Griffith
compelled the application of Pennsylvania law, the court held that
the decision of the lower court could also be affirmed by principles
of maritime law. 14 Referring again to Weinstein for its holding that
tort claims for injuries sustained in a plane crash on navigable waters
are maritime in nature, 5 the court ruled that maritime principles
govern the tort aspects of the instant case, even though brought on
the "law side" of the district court.16 Reaching this conclusion, how-
ever, did not decide the question, because the general maritime law
(as well as the common law) provides no remedy for wrongful death.17
To fill this gap, Congress has enacted the Jones Act 8 (giving repre-
sentatives of deceased seamen a cause of action for wrongful death);
the Death on The High Seas by Wrongful Act 19 (giving a right to the
representatives of those dying at sea) and maritime courts have, in
certain causes within their jurisdiction, permitted recovery pursuant to
12. 316 F.2d 758, 3d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 940 (1963).
13. 316 F.2d at 766.
14. 399 F.2d at 25.
15. "We are of the opinion for the reasons stated that the tort claims sub judice lie
within the admiralty jurisdiction of the court below." 316 F.2d at 766. (This case dealt
with claims arising from the same plane crash involved in Scott.)
16. 399 F.2d at 25.
17. The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199 (1886).
18. 46 U.S.C. § 688.
19. 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-767.
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state enacted statutes.20 The problem confronting the court was whether
maritime law compelled it to apply the survival and wrongful death
statutes of Massachusetts or Pennsylvania.
Eastern contended it could find no wrongful death cases in the
admiralty where "lex loci" had not been applied. The Scott court,
however, felt that this did not result from application of a rigid mari-
time principle and that creation of such a principle would today be
unwarranted. It decided instead to apply a "significant contacts" choice
of law rule to the maritime tort aspects of the case, finding justification
for its novel approach in a trend established by the Supreme Court in
"Romero21 and Lauritzen.22 The court observed that in each case the
Supreme Court had reviewed the " 'connecting factors which either
maritime law or our municipal law of conflicts regards as significant
in determining the law applicable to a claim of actionable wrong.' "
(Emphasis added).23 And though Lauritzen and Romero dealt with a
United States-foreign law conflict rather than with a conflict be-
tween the survival and death statutes of two states, the court ap-
parently did not deem this a significant distinction. The court of
appeals also observed that jurisdiction after jurisdiction was abandon-
ing a rigid adherence to the "lex loci" rule in civil tort cases, in favor
of a more sophisticated, meaningful and realistic choice of law cri-
terion which takes into account analysis of the interests of the involved
parties and jurisdictions. 24 On these bases, the court decided that it
had an obligation to refrain from applying the substantive law of a
disinterested jurisdiction. Thus, use of a contacts interest analysis to
decide the maritime choice of law question, resulted in the application
of Pennsylvania law.25
The contract theory for affirming the district court in Scott is rea-
sonable in light of the holding of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in
Griffith26 that characterization of an action as ex contractu does not
20. The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 558 (1959); The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199 (1886).
21. 358 U.S. 354 (1959).
22. 345 U.S. 571 (1953).
23. 399 F. 2d at 27, citing Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 592 (1953).
24. 399 F.2d at 28. However, none of the cases cited by the court involved maritime
torts.
25. 399 F.2d at 28.
26. Analysis of Griffith reveals that the court considered five factors to be relevant
to the choice of law question: the place of the injury; the place where the relationship
between the parties was created; the domicile of the decedent; the place of the administra-
tion of the decedent's estate; and the domicile of the decedent's surviving dependents.
However, the very rigidity and mechanicalness that the court sought to escape can result
from applying a set of factors like these to every case. It is submitted that rather than
substitute one mechanical test for another, the court should have analyzed the various
326
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prevent application of the tort choice of law rule, and the federal
court decision in Weinstein holding that a contract of nonnegligent
carriage is not maritime. The court thus treated the suit as a pure
civil action, and under the holdings of Klaxon v. Stentor Elec. Mfg.
Co., Inc. and Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins2 7 Pennsylvania conflicts and
internal law was applied.
The conclusion by the Court of Appeals that the tort aspects of
the case must be governed by maritime law because the fatal injuries
occurred on navigable waters is, however, unsound. The court made
the common error of overlooking "the strange principle" that sub-
stantive rules of law in maritime causes vary "depending on whether
the conduct gives rise to fatal or non-fatal injuries."28 Since the mari-
.time law provides no remedy for wrongful death occurring on state
navigable waters29 and must borrow the wrongful death statute of a
state,30 the remedy borrowed is state created and not rooted in the
maritime law.31 Accordingly, while the action can be brought in ad-
miralty, it is not a truly maritime action, but rather a state cause of
action enforceable in admiralty, by virtue of the situs of the injury. 32
Admiralty courts enforce the cause as they would "one originating in
any foreign jurisdiction,"'3 and they are required to treat it as an
integrated whole, subject to those conditions and limitations which
the creating state has attached.3 4 This means that defenses such as con-
tributory negligence and assumption of the risk may be asserted if
recognized in the creating state, although they are not ordinarily
state interests. Subsequent to Griffith, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has indicated that
it may in fact be using a pure interest analysis. In McSwain v. McSwain, 420 Pa. 86, 215
A.2d 677 (1966), the court explained that it will analyze the extent to which a state has
demonstrated a priority of interest in the application of its rule of law. In this area
generally, see Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U.L.REv.
267 (1966).
27. Under the doctrine of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 54 (1938), in a diversity
case a federal district court must apply the internal substantive law of the state in which
it sits. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., Inc., 313 U.S. 487 (1941) held that state con-
flict of law rules are a part of this internal substantive law.
28. The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 558, 611 (1959) (dissenting opinion). Mr. Justice
Brennan was describing the majority's decision, a decision which controls the facts of the
Scott case, If the injuries are not fatal, the admiralty will provide an exclusively maritime
remedy. If they are fatal, it must borrow a state remedy to enforce. Thus the substantive
law will vary depending on the nature of the injury.
29. Hess v. United States, 361 U.S. 314 (1960); The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199 (1886).
However, if the fatal injuries are sustained by a seaman, there is an admiralty remedy
under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688.
30. Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U.S. 233 (1921).
31, The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 558 (1959); The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199 (1886).
32. Just v. Chambers, 312 U.S. 383 (1941); Hess v. United States, 361 U.S. 314 (1960).
33. Levinson v. Deupree, 345 U.S. 648, 652 (1953).
34. The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 US. 558 (1959).
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available in admiralty, 5 and certain defenses available only in mari-
time law are prohibited unless valid under the state's law.36
It is clear then, contrary to the court's ruling in Scott that maritime
principles govern the tort aspects of the case, that state substantive law
applies whether the action is brought in admiralty or at law.3 7 This
being so, it becomes imperative to determine whether the state choice
of law rule is to be treated as a part of the state substantive law.
In this unique situation, where a state wrongful death statute must
be borrowed by the admiralty, it must be determined precisely how
much of the appurtenant state law must be adopted by the admiralty
court in borrowing the state remedy. Particularly, the court must deter-
mine whether the state choice of law rule comes into the admiralty
court together with its wrongful death statute. The Supreme Court
has held in The Tungus v. Skovgaard38 and Hess v. United States,3 9
that, if a state law constitutes a "condition or limitation" on its wrong-
ful death remedy, it is controlling on the admiralty.40 Whether a
state's choice of law rule constitutes a significant limitation on its
wrongful death remedy thus is a critical determination in maritime
actions for wrongful death.
Although this precise issue has not yet been judicially decided,
choice of law rules in non-maritime areas have been traditionally
regarded as procedural rather than substantive. 41 Applying this tradi-
tional approach to Scott would justify the conclusion of the Third
Circuit that maritime choice of law rules are applicable. So construed
they could not be deemed as conditions or limitations on the state
created right.
It is suggested that a sounder approach would be to regard state
choice of law rules as substantive. Yet, treating the problem solely
as one of characterization of the matter as substantive or procedural is
to stop at surface analysis. In cases brought pursuant to its diversity
jurisdiction, a federal district court is compelled to apply the internal
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Goett v. Union Carbide Corp., 361 U.S. 340 (1960); Hess v. United States, 361 U.S.
314 (1960); The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 558 (1959).
38. 358 U.S. 558 (1959).
39. 361 U.S. 314 (1960).
40. The Tungus v. Skovgaard
, 358 U.S. 558 (1959).
41. See Hill, State Procedural Law in Federal Nondiversity Litigation, 69 HAR,. L.
REv. 66, 84 (1955).
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substantive law of the state in Which it sits.4 2 And the Supreme Court
has stated that in determining whether a law is substantive or pro-
cedural it will put aside abstractions and will consider only whether
the law will substantially affect the result. 43 Thus in diversity cases,
if the application of a particular state law would significantly affect
the outcome of the case in a state court, that principle must be
applied by the federal court.
It is submitted that this "outcome determinative" test can logically
be applied to maritime actions borrowing a state wrongful death
statute. The Supreme Court has held in diversity cases that choice of
law rules do significantly affect the outcome of a case44 and it seems clear
that when an admiralty court is enforcing a state created remedy,
applying the "affect the result" test to the state's choice of law rule
should produce an identical holding. The admiralty court would then
treat the state choice of law rule as being a limitation or condition on
the wrongful death statute and apply it to resolve any conflicts.
Application of this approach to the facts of Scott would produce a
result identical with that reached by the court of appeals, but on more
justifiable grounds. The court's effort to construe maritime conflicts
law so as to free themselves from the shackles of the "lex loci delicti"
rule, while commendable, was unnecessary. Had it recognized that
maritime law need not exclusively govern all matters occurring on
navigable waters, it would not have been compelled to extend the
Lauritzen and Romero choice of law doctrines to areas arguably-dis-
tinguishable from the facts of those cases. This is somewhat analogous
to the position taken by Judge Seitz in his concurring opinion,45 al-
though he reached this point as a result of the "saving to suitors"
clause, 46 rather than by concluding that the matters before him were
not maritime in nature. Thus, his opinion is. in reality only analogous
because the injured party in Scott died, and because the admiralty
42. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). An exception to this general rule is
a maritime cause brought as a diversity action pursuant to the "saving to suitors" clause.
(See note 46, inlra). Even though brought as a civil action, maritime law will still apply.
See G. GILMORE AND C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY § 6-58-62, (1957).
43. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108 (1944).
44. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
45. 399 F.2d at 32 where Judge Seitz stated "I believe the judgment below can be
affirmed without consideration of any issue of substantive maritime law .. "
. 46. 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1) (1964). Originally a provision in the Judiciary Act of 1789,
1 Stat. 76, which, in conferring exclusive jurisdiction on the federal courts of all civil
cases of admiralty and maritime substance, saved to suitors in all cases the right of a
common law remedy where the common law is competent to give it.
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provides no remedy for wrongful death. Had plaintiff sustained only
personal injuries, ostensibly Judge Seitz would have, as did the ma-
jority, applied maritime substantive law regardless of whether the
action was commenced within or without the admiralty jurisdiction.
Underlying the choice of law problems of Scott is a basic flaw that
is perhaps the key to the whole case. The flaw stems from the earlier
decision of the Third Circuit in Weinstein v. Eastern Airlines, Inc.,
47
that a tort claim for injuries sustained in a plane crash into state
navigable waters was maritime.48 Although there was substantial au-
thority to justify the court's holding that locality is the sole criterion
for maritime tort jurisdiction,49 it is arguable that such should not be
the case.50 Indeed, recent cases have shown that a rigid adherence to
the locality test of maritime tort jurisdiction is not necessary to insure
admiralty jurisdiction in the areas where it has a traditional purpose
and interest.51 A departure from the "strict locality test" would rid
the admiralty of cases like Scott and Weinstein where there is no sound
reason for the application of maritime law.
If airplane crashes into state Waters were treated as unrelated to
maritime commerce, and thus not within the jurisdiction of the ad-
miralty, many of the problems encountered by the court in Scott in
attempting to use a modern flexible approach to the choice of law
issues would be nonexistent.5 2
It is submitted that, not withstanding the soundness of its result, the
reasoning in Scott furthers the confusion begun by Weinstein in the
area of admiralty tort jurisdiction. The court failed to recognize that
substantive maritime law does not apply to actions for wrongful death
on navigable waters of a state, since whether the suit is brought in ad-
miralty or as a diversity action as in Scott, the substantive issues are
governed by state law.
47. 316 F.2d 758 (3d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 940 (1963).
48. Id. at 766.
49. Id. at 761-62, n.9, 10, 11.
50. See, Comment, Admiralty Jurisdiction: Airplanes and Wrongful Death in Terri-
torial Waters, 64 COLUM. L. REv. 1084 (1964); Pelaez, Admiralty Tort Jurisdiction-The
Last Barrier, 7 DUQUESNE L. REv. 1 (1968).
51. Two such cases are McGuire v. City of New York, 192 F. Supp. 866 (S.D.N.Y. 1961),
and Chapman v. City of Grosse Pointe Farms, 385 F.2d 962 (6th Cir. 1967). Both cases
dealt with injuries to swimmers and found them to be without the jurisdiction of the
admiralty even though the injuries had occurred on navigable waters. These cases are the
leading authorities for the so called "locality plus" test for admiralty jurisdiction, requir-
ing locality "plus" some connection with maritime commerce. For an in depth treatment
of these cases and several others and a discussion of admiralty tort jurisdiction, see
Pelaez, Admiralty Tort jurisdiction-The Last Barrier 7 DUQUESNE L. REv. 1 (1968).
52. See generally, Moore and Pelaez, Admiralty Jurisdiction-The Sky's the Limit, 33 J.
Ant L. & Com. 3, 19-27 (1967).
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In addition, choice of law rules in actions where the admiralty does
not provide a remedy should be viewed as substantive. Once this deter-
mination is made the entire approach to the case changes. It then
becomes unnecessary to construe cases like Lauritzen and Romero and
the prevailing choice of law test can be applied without the need to
go out on a limb to do so as did Scott. One forseeable problem with
the Scott rationale is that the conflicts approach of Lauritzen and
Romero, while in complete harmony with Pennsylvania conflicts law,
may be unacceptable in other jurisdictions where similar actions may
be litigated, resulting in splits between circuits on this point. If, how-
ever, each jurisdiction's own choice of law rule can be applied even
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